Page 12 - Demo

12Commander, Squire received much information relating to the build-upof No 1 Sqn from ACAS(Ops) and HQ 18 Group but %u2018little from his ownsuperior formations, HQ Strike Command and HQ 38 Group%u2019. Hayrcertainly appreciated the sensitivities in these matters and took pains tokeep the normal authorities in the picture %u2013 and particularly SASO atStrike Command %u2013 but inevitably there were complaints, and confusionwas unavoidable at times.I think, too, Ken would have reminded us of some of the externalmatters that also came his way, and particularly the considerable help weneeded, and received, from the Americans. Ron Dick will speak later onthis but I%u2019ll mention here one major subject that became apparent veryearly on as soon as we realised the critical importance of Wideawakeairfield on Ascension Island. This was going to be central to all of theRAF%u2019s air operations and especially those depending on air-to-airrefuelling, but very little aviation fuel was available on the spot. So,throughout April, difficulty in obtaining adequate quantities by tankerfrom the USA was a constant, virtually overriding, constraint on theRAF%u2019s planning and operations, and it was one of Ken%u2019s greatestanxieties. Jeremy Price will probably say more about this.In concluding, Ken might have repeated one of his closing remarks tome. The way in which the %u2018system%u2019 that was improvised actually worked,he said, was a tribute to the ability of countless individuals to adaptthemselves to a very special situation and accept that a great manycorners had to be cut.Although not often mentioned, the VC10s of No 10 Sqn were heavilyinvolved in Op CORPORATE throughout, sustaining the UK-ASI link.