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11economies over the years and it took time to bring in reinforcements ofsuitable quality and to prepare the necessary assessments and analyses.Consequently in the earlier stages there was some underestimation of theArgentine air capabilities but by the time the Task Force arrived in theSouth Atlantic a full picture of threats and capabilities had been puttogether.Then there was security. Few working in the MOD %u2013 or elsewhere %u2013had ever experienced an actual war situation with the risks entailed inplanning and mounting %u2018live%u2019 military operations, and Hayr decided to beextremely strict in applying %u2018need to know%u2019. Some officials, especially inother government departments, felt he was being too secretive andwithholding information which they thought was essential for them to dotheir own jobs, but he remained adamant. He was anxious too about thesystem for distributing signals; it wasn%u2019t easy to ensure that copies ofsignals on sensitive matters were in fact seen only by the people forwhom they were intended. From his experience in CORPORATE he felttoo little attention had been devoted to this aspect in the development ofthe modern signals system.The overall picture he tried to present to me was that he, asACAS(Ops), found himself co-ordinating the whole of the RAF%u2019scontribution to the Falklands operation. He needed to be in touch directlyof course with Sir John Curtiss, AOC 18 Group, and his staff atNorthwood. It was he who had been appointed Air Commander for theoperation and, as such, he was responsible to CinC Fleet, AdmiralFieldhouse, who commanded the Task Force. His was an obviousappointment, since his Headquarters was located alongside CinC Fleet%u2019sown HQ at Northwood, and the RAF and naval staffs there wereaccustomed to working together and got on well. On the other hand, 18Group%u2019s own resources of aircraft were restricted to those required for itsnormal maritime role and the Air Commander was going to need manymore which would have to be drawn from other parts of the RAF.Moreover, as the scope for the RAF%u2019s commitments expanded, attimes in quite unforeseen ways, they needed these resources at once. Inmany cases there was simply not enough time to go through the normalchannels of communication, so Hayr and his staff were in direct andfrequent touch with lower formations throughout the Service. Thisapplied not just to aircraft but to a huge range of support equipment andpersonnel. As one case in point, and there were many more, then Wing