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10So my purpose now, having suitably refreshed my memory, is tomention a few of the things that I think he might have said about hiswork in London had he been here today %u2013 and in so doing to pay tributeto a man whom so many of us remember as one of the RAF%u2019s finestofficers. In early 1982 he was serving in the Air Force Department asAssistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) [ACAS(Ops)], answeringthrough Sir David Craig (VCAS) to Sir Michael Beetham (CAS).It is very important for us to bear in mind today that a conflict in theSouth Atlantic had never been envisaged, never mind planned for. TheRAF command structure at that time was essentially geared to the UK%u2019sNATO commitments and control of the RAF%u2019s operational resources laywith Strike Command. It was not ACAS(Ops) who controlled them but,in practice, in the unique Falklands situation, many of them would haveto be drawn upon from the centre %u2013 and quickly. Moreover the wholeoperation would have to be under close political control with the keyoperational decisions being taken within the MOD %u2013 and with the regularadvice and support of other government departments. So all of this putthe practical RAF aspects in the court of ACAS(Ops) himself.Even before the Argentine invasion Hayr had been exchanging ideaswith his Navy and Army opposite numbers, and on 31 March heintroduced 24-hour three-shift manning of the Air Force OperationsRoom. From then on he, as the continuity man responsible for virtuallyall RAF decisions in a constantly developing situation, simply worked allthe hours he possibly could. His own three air commodores, includingJohn Price, led each of the shifts in turn. As Ken told me afterwards, hefelt he really should have had an %u2018alter ego%u2019, an extra air commodore whowas fully read into his mind and not working shifts.Ken remembered also %u2018the live sense of jointery%u2019 among the variousMOD staffs, including the civil servants. Such was the urgency of thesituation, too, that the procurement procedures were greatly simplifiedand %u2013 of great importance %u2013 the customary financial restraints wereconsiderably eased %u2013 though confusion did arise, for example, in thedelegated engineering authorities when new equipments andmodifications were urgently needed and the established channels ofauthority needed to be by-passed.A serious problem of a different kind was the supply %u2013 or rathervirtual absence %u2013 of intelligence about the South Atlantic and about theArgentine forces. This was the price of continuing staff cuts and other