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87Fly Away Packs (FAPs), tool kits, specialist equipment and detailedplans existed and, more importantly, had been proved.This is not to suggest that the logistics challenges faced by the RAFin the Falklands Campaign were routine; but they were notunprecedented. The Harrier force, like the Jaguar, both of which wereearmarked for an ACE Mobile Force and/or Regional Reinforcementrole, was experienced in deployed operations and had the necessarysupporting equipment as well as the underpinning doctrine and training.A similar case could be made for the support helicopter, maritime and airtransport forces. Of course, deployed operations are not the same asexpeditionary warfare, but while the RAF was largely focused onsupporting NATO%u2019s Central Region, significant elements of the Order ofBattle, were prepared for wider employment %u2013 if necessary at somedistance from the main base.This ability should not be taken lightly. Deployed operations demanda competence and confidence that many, if not most, air forces do notpossess. Even today, a number of NATO%u2019s European air forces still findthe prospect of operating away from main bases well outside theircomfort zone.Now, I am not arguing that the RAF was fully prepared, either fordeployed operations or for expeditionary warfare %u2013 the record indicatesotherwise %u2013 but I believe we can paint too dark a picture if we are notcareful. The logistic contribution to the Falklands Campaign was built onstrong foundations.I shall return to these themes later but, in view of the limited timeavailable, I will now briefly review the logistic challenges faced by theRAF before finishing with lessons learned.ENGINEERINGGenerationThe initial engineering task was to generate aircraft (including RNSea Harriers). However, beyond this first flurry of activity, the RAF%u2019scapacity to assist the Task Force was influenced by shortcomings in roleequipment, particularly in regard to AAR, stand-off weapons, long-rangenavigation, communications and EW. In fact, CE(RAF) later observedthat much of the subsequent engineering story concerned ways ofmaking good this shortfall.2