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84command and control over a ground based air defence environment. Hadthis decision been made at the outset, provision could have been madefor a proper GBAD cell, headed by a Regiment wing commander, in theForce HQ.Army Rapier units lacked the training and expertise for operating aShort Range Air Defence Zone around an airstrip. The Army%u2019srequirement for anti-aircraft defence is to protect ground forces in theforward area where the engagement of hostile aircraft takes precedenceover the positive identification of friendly aircraft. It was probablyfortunate for No 1 Sqn that T Battery RA had moved forward from SanCarlos to Fitzroy and Bluff Cove where its Rapiers continued to operateat %u2018Weapons Free%u2019.There was a declared threat of ground attack by Argentine specialforces on the San Carlos FOB, but no RAF Regiment ground defenceunits had been included in the force. Consequently, ground defence ofthe Harriers was an ad hoc affair, depending upon the goodwill of anyArmy or RM personnel who happened to be temporarily in the vicinity.Finally, the haste with which Operation CORPORATE had to beplanned, at least as far as No 63 Sqn was concerned, resulted in arepetition of many of the failings of Operations TORCH and HUSKY in1942 and 1943 when Regiment units were dispersed among a variety ofships, separated from their equipment and landed on the invasionbeaches without any regard for their urgent operational deployment toforward airstrips. Fortunately, on this occasion the results were not asdamaging as they had been forty years earlier.Sources:Sqn Ldr I P G Loughborough (OC No.63 Squadron RAF Regiment).Wg Cdr T T Wallis (Senior Regiment Officer, Ascension Island).Gp Capt A B Stephens (Deputy Head, Air Historical Branch).