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85LOGISTICS AND THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGNAir Commodore Peter DyePeter Dye was commissioned into the EngineeringBranch in 1972. His subsequent career hasconcentrated on aircraft-related appointments, his%u2018hands on%u2019 experience embracing the Victor,Canberra, Vulcan, Tornado and Jaguar. In the lattercase, he was directly responsible for the deploymentand support of the Coltishall Jaguars sent to theGulf in 1990-91. His most recent appointment wasas Deputy Chief Executive, Defence Aviation RepairAgency and Air Officer Wales; he is currently AirCommodore Ground Training with the Training Group Defence Agency.INTRODUCTIONFor many the Falklands Campaign was a distant affair. Working inthe Central Servicing Development Establishment I can perhaps claim tohave been more remote than most %u2013 but not entirely so, as I will explainlater.Surprisingly little has been written about the logistic aspects of theFalklands Campaign %u2013 although security of supply and extended lines ofcommunication were a major and continuing preoccupation in theplanning and conduct of operations. I am grateful to the Society,therefore, for the opportunity to record some aspects of a complex andsignificant story.1The passage of time also provides an opportunity to reflect on theengineering and supply lessons learned. Two questions are, I believe,worthy of debate, the extent to which the demands made on the RAFlogistic system were unprecedented %u2013 at least in Cold War terms %u2013 and,secondly, whether they had any bearing on our readiness for the GulfWar some eight years later.It is always tempting to identify key moments in history, but from alogistics perspective the Falklands Campaign was, if not a turning point,the first sign that one might be approaching.The RAF%u2019s support posture in the early 1980s reflected theassumption that a short but intensive war would be fought from wellfound main bases. Our logistic arrangements were centred on significant