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114by the time of the Gulf War. The PMO at Strike Command in 1990-91was AVM Alan Johnson and he very quickly gave authority for thecommanders of our deployed forces to issue Temazepam to all aircrewwho were actively engaged. It really was necessary, because thecampaign involved round-the-clock operations. For aircrew actuallyliving on the airfields, as at Tabuk, the noise alone meant that it was verydifficult to get to sleep and, while less acute, the problem was alsoapparent where people were accommodated off-base, as at Muharraq.We had much the same problem in the bunker at High Wycombe,because it too was being manned on a 24-hour basis. I was on shiftmyself from the week before the war began right through to the end. Iused to go on duty at 10 o%u2019clock at night and I would come off at 1o%u2019clock, lunchtime, the next day. Trying to get your head down at 3 pmin the afternoon so that you could get 6 hour%u2019s sleep before having to getup again at nine in the evening so that you were back in the bunker anhour later was simply impractical, particularly when it went on for eightconsecutive weeks. I don%u2019t think that I could have survived that regimemuch longer without using Temazepam. I know that Alan Johnson wasgetting slightly worried after I had been taking it for two months but Ihad absolutely no side effects and, as soon as the war was over I stoppedand resumed a normal working routine. I had absolutely no after effects;nor did I experience any difficulty in re-establishing a natural sleeppattern.So, the use of selected drugs is well understood and the practice isnow an accepted feature of 24-hour all-weather operations. So long asthey are being taken under a properly structured and controlledprogramme, which has been approved and authorised by the appropriatemedical authorities, it causes me no concern whatsoever. Indeed, the AirTransport Force, which currently includes my own son, routinely usesTemazepam when they go down route.Sir Peter Squire. Regarding the second question, on the RWR, I thinkthat, as a Service, we have, in the past, probably been guilty of investingmost of our money in platforms; the acquisition of the weapons andsystems needed for the operational role has tended to be something of asecondary consideration. I believe that we are now much better at doingthis. I think the very effective combination of platforms and weaponsthat we have in our current front line are the result of learning from past