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109failure in deterrence in our East/West relations would carry a far heavierpenalty. In the event, however, the Soviet Union would have noted theUK%u2019s unswerving determination to regain the islands %u2013 if not bydiplomatic negotiation then by force, in spite of the risks %u2013 and, with it,our commitment to the principle of self-determination.Now, twenty years later, what are some of the conclusions I draw?As an aberration in Cold War terms, the Falklands War was verymuch the forerunner of today%u2019s Expeditionary Operations, with astrong Joint ingredient, even if the Services were not well preparedfor such interaction.That we can operate RAF combat squadrons from a maritimeplatform, either as a DOB or as the starting point prior to movingashore. However, the carrier must be appropriately configured foroffensive tasking which was by no means the case in 1982.The combination of distance, and a lack of today%u2019s technology, madethe Falklands the last occasion when military commanders had anyreal control over the media. Whilst I favour the embedding ofcorrespondents into formed units, as the lesser of the evils, today%u2019sexperience reveals quite clearly that the insatiable demand fordramatic news or pictures will have implications for the conduct ofoperations and the welfare of our families.1982 saw the first use in conflict of smart weapons by the RAF, evenif the method of delivery was somewhat Heath Robinson. In thetwenty years that have elapsed since, we have seen the split betweendumb and smart reverse. In 1991 the percentage of smart weaponsused in the Gulf War was 10%, although those 10% produced about80% of the effect on the ground. In Kosovo, the ratio was 60:40 infavour of smart and in the current conflict in Iraq the split is 90:10.Regardless of cost, smart precision weapons are the only wayforward.At the end of the day, it is the quality of the young men and womenwho fill our ranks that makes the difference. Well educated, welltrained, well motivated and led, they provide the decision makers andthe glue that holds the decision-making process together, as well asbeing the practitioners on the ground and the warriors in the air thatget the very most out of the weapon systems they operate.