Page 107 - Demo

107parked on the strip at any onetime. As a rule, two GR3s weredetached on a daily basis toprovide quick reaction supportfor ground forces, whilst the SeaHarriers used it extensively inorder to lengthen significantlytheir time on combat air patrol.It would, however, be quitewrong to suggest that we had itall our own way. Indeed the lossof an aircraft on our second dayof operations was a swiftreminder that we were unlikely tocome through unscathed.Experience quickly showed thatthe greatest threat was fromground-to-air weapons, whichvaried from surface-to-airmissiles to small arms fire. Thetwo major SAM systems wereRoland and Tigercat, and we hada fair idea as to where these were located. We therefore planned to flyoutside or below their respective engagement zones and, although asubstantial number of both types of missile were launched at us, nonewas successful. The remaining SAM threat came from the shoulderlaunched variety, Blowpipe and the Russian SAM-7, both of which werein plentiful supply. Again, our tactics of flying very low and fast seemedlargely to negate this threat; indeed photographs taken on combatmissions clearly showed soldiers carrying shoulder-launched SAMs butfacing the wrong way because they had not been alerted in time to reactto our very high-speed approach. That said, it is almost certain that thefirst of our aircraft to be shot down was engaged by Blowpipe.The Argentineans were also equipped with a large quantity of AAAguns, ranging from 20mm to 35mm, some of which were linked to firecontrol radars. Although these tended to be sited in known areas, theyposed a high threat to our aircraft, and indeed we lost a second aircraftduring the attack on Goose Green.The Harrier strip at San Carlos.