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96%u2018Supporting The Royal Air Force%u2019, Aeronautical Journal, Aug/Sep 83.7 Alfred Price, Harrier At War, (London, 1984), pages 104-107.8 During the period 2 April to 4 June 1982 Ascension Island handled a total of 10,600helicopter and 2500 fixed-wing flights. The airlift moved some 7000 tons of ammunition,vehicles and other cargo as well as over 6500 passengers.9 Movements Presentation on Op CORPORATE, D/D Mov(RAF) 1/20 dated September1982.10 Engines were given an anti-corrosion spray and sealed while pylons andundercarriages were liberally coated with PX28 before the entire aircraft was covered ina %u2018Driclad%u2019 plastic cover.11 Bryan Mason, Servicing and Operating Shipborne Harrier GR3 during the FalklandsCrisis, ENG/GR3/MAS/1 dated Sep 82.12 The number of deployed TCW personnel reached nearly 120, providing essentialsupport at Ascension Island and to 5 Brigade.13 The sole No 18 Sqn Chinook flew for 109 hrs without servicing, carrying 2150 troops,550 prisoners and 550 tons of freight %u2013 in the absence of engineering documentation,tools or spares. Sir John Curtiss, %u2018The RAF Contribution to the Falklands Campaign%u2019,pages 24-32, Naval Review, Jan 83.14 The Victor tanker force had exceeded its annual flying task by the end of June.15 Bruce Watson & Peter Dunn, Military Lessons of the Falklands Island War; Viewsfrom the United States, (London, 1984), page 39. The Skyhawk seems to have sufferedparticularly badly in this regard. Spares shortages and maintenance problems reducedoverall availability to some 66% (allowing for attrition) by the end of hostilities. RodneyBurden et al, Falklands - The Air War, (London, 1986), pages 39-43.16 This was the first of a succession of imaginatively titled deployable facilities such asthe TESCO (TIALD Engineering Support Cabin Operation) and the SAINSBURI(Special Avionic Instrument Network System and Basic Unite Repair Installation) repairworkshops employed in the Gulf War.17 Falkland Islands Conflict Aircraft Battle Damage Repair, 4STT/700/30/Trg dated 4Feb 03 and Bryan Mason, Battle Damage Repair %u2013 Harrier GR3, BDR/GR3/MAS/1dated 31 Aug 82.18 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol III, (Washington, 1993), page 391.19 The Official Report on the Falklands Campaign did not identify specific logisticlessons learned. These lessons reflect, therefore, my personal interpretation drawing onthe AHB Narrative where possible. Secretary of State for Defence, The FalklandsCampaign: The Lessons, HMSO, London, December 1982.20 Tony Mason, %u2018%u201cHay for the Hobby Horses%u201d: Reflections on the Air War in the SouthAtlantic, 1982%u2019, pages 32-41, RUSI Journal, December 1982.21 House of Commons, Implementing The Lessons Of The Falklands Campaign, pagelxxx, Fourth Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1986-87, HMSO, London.