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95Cold War.An emotional reaction perhaps, but genuine all the same. It istempting to see this reflected across the whole engineering and supplycommunity as a greater sense of self-confidence and maturity, which,married to improved processes and support capabilities, provided theessential foundation for logistic success in the Gulf War.CONCLUSIONSThe Falklands Campaign tested every aspect of the RAF logisticorganisation and tested it hard. Processes were found to be basicallysound and the overall system sufficiently flexible and responsive.However, flexibility does not happen by accident %u2018it depends on theimagination and ingenuity of the men who are working themachines.%u2026.and to succeed they must be based on the equally essentialqualities of determination and reliability.20 There is little doubt that theenthusiasm and commitment of individual engineers, suppliers andmovers made a telling contribution to the campaign%u2019s successfuloutcome. Little wonder that the House of Commons Defence Committeesubsequently observed that %u2018the British Victory in the Falkland Islandswas a tribute to the planning and hard work of all those involved in thelogistic support to the Task Force.%u201921Notes:1 Very little literature has been published on the logistic aspects of the FalklandsCampaign, other than some early articles that focus almost exclusively on the sea andland campaigns. For example: Bruce Schoch, %u2018Logistics of the Falklands War%u2019, pages2-7, Army Logistician, May-Jun 1986; %u2018Logistic Support for Operation Corporate%u2019 by%u2018Supporter%u2019, pages 264-271, Naval Review, October 1982; Valerie Adams, %u2018LogisticSupport for the Falklands Campaign%u2019, pages 43-49, RUSI Journal, September 1984; andMatthew Klimow, %u2018British Logistics in the Falklands%u2019, pages 155-162, Combined Arms,Fort Leavenworth, 1992.2 Narrative of RAF Operations During the Falklands Conflict, AHB(RAF), 1988.3Ibid.4 St Athan%u2019s workload on the Sea Harrier and Victor was particularly heavy, whileEWAU was closely involved in the provision and installation of long-range navigationalequipment, RWR and special communications fits.5 This includes aircraft such as the Puma and the Canberra, that in the event were notdeployed, or modifications, such as the carriage of Martel by the Vulcan, that were nottaken forward.6 During Op GRANBY the RAF introduced over 300 modifications across twelvedifferent aircraft types at a cost of %u00a366M and 300,000 man hours: Sir Michael Alcock,