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23reposition aircraft to fly the required sorties. In effect, as the majority oftasks involved AAR, Admiral Fieldhouse had to decide if he wantedvery long range Nimrod surveillance, Vulcan operations or Herculesdrops to the ships. It was only much later, when other aircraft wereprovided with a tanker capability, that this situation was eased. But thenumbers of large aircraft parked at Ascension, on occasions, stillimpacted on operational flexibility.Looking back, it seems as if things were relatively quiet after thesinking of HMS Sheffield on 4 May until 21 May, when the bridgeheadwas established at San Carlos. But, of course, it was actually very busy.Further Vulcan attacks were mounted on Stanley; Nimrods were nowoperating in the general area of the Falklands; Hercules dropped sparesto the Fleet and two pairs of Harriers transited the 3000 miles fromAscension to the Task Group. Additionally, Harrier attacks and navalshore bombardment were softening up the Argentines.When the assault and supporting ships were in San Carlos Sound theimplications of the Fleet%u2019s lack of AEW cover became very obvious. Theonly prior warning of air attack came from the SSNs operating atperiscope depth off the Argentinean coast in the vicinity of their airfieldsand the picket ships well in advance of the Fleet.It was very sobering to receive, in almost real time, the news of shipssunk and enemy aircraft shot down by Harriers, land-based andshipborne missiles and gunfire. The ship losses were a great concern tothe CinC. Indeed he confided to me later that, had the Argentineanspersisted with air strikes after 25 May, the outcome of the campaignmight have been very different. But it could have been much worse if thefusing of the bombs dropped by their aircraft had been correct. Many ofthe bombs went straight through the ships, while others which did not,failed to explode.The sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor with the loss of the Chinooks,their spares, spares for the Harrier and planking for their FOB, was agreat blow and affected the RAF contribution to the battle and meant thearmy would have to walk to Stanley.Both Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor were sunk by Exocet missilesfrom Super Entendards, a weapon/aircraft combination most feared bythe Task Group commanders as the major threat to his carriers. Indeedthe Argentines thought they had hit Hermes when they struck AtlanticConveyor. We knew the number of Exocets the Argentines had (I think it