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122Argentineans gained the impression that we didn%u2019t really care about theislands, an impression gained in the course of some discussions thatNicholas Ridley and Richard Luce had with them in New York in themargins of the United Nations. Nevertheless, when, in the fullness oftime, the Argentineans probed into South Georgia, this was not read inWhitehall as being a prelude to invasion.Well, how wrong can you be? In spite of our assessment of theproblems of defending the Falklands, the Prime Minister and theGovernment knew that they had to do something because, if they didn%u2019t,the Government might well fall. In the first instance, everyone hopedthat the negotiations which Al Haig was conducting, shuttling to and frobetween Buenos Aires, Washington and London, would be successful.But we felt that we still had to show that we were determined not toaccept the invasion. The Navy, who had been deeply wounded by thedefence review, said immediately, and before there had been anydiscussions between the Chiefs of Staff, that they could assemble anddeploy a Task Force. Frankly, they hadn%u2019t really thought through all ofthe implications of what that involved. At the time, however, it wouldhave been very difficult to object because publicly stating that you wereassembling a Task Force represented a deterrent, and it was just possiblethat that alone might have done the trick. On that basis, we actuallypublicised the fact that we were converting the Vulcan to theconventional role, that we were mobilising Harriers and that we werebuilding up the air-to-air refuelling force. It was all part of the deterrentposture. We told the Press; we told everyone, in the hope that themessage would get through and that it would reinforce Haig%u2019s efforts.Sadly, it was to no avail and we had no option but to follow through.Since we had long concluded that, in military terms, the Falklandswere not defendable without major resources, we have to ask why it wasthat we succeeded in regaining them. The Falklands are about 400 milesfrom the mainland, which was fortunate for us, because this was at theextreme of the Argentinean Air Force%u2019s operating range. If it had been300 miles I don%u2019t think that we could have pulled it off. We were alsofortunate in that we had Ascension Island as a mounting base. As wasmade very clear this morning, the key to the use of Ascension was thesupport provided by the Americans who, apart from operating theairfield, extended assistance in many other ways, most significantly inthe provision of fuel, of which we needed considerable quantities.