Page 71 - Demo

71perhaps the worst offender, sometimes promoting or demoting Free French personnel without informing, letting alone asking, the Air Ministry first.43%u0009%u0013/)%u0016%4&%u0016%u0015%u0013/?%u0006 Nevertheless, despite the problems that they created, the national units certainly served their purpose. Apart from their operational contribution, they also served a useful propaganda role. They had a long term value, too, feeding into the fifth principle, that of Construction. The Air Ministry undertook to work towards creating independent, self8contained national air forces that could be established in their native countries when liberation came. By March 1944, the Air Ministry was already receiving a growing number of requests in this context. These had to be handled with some care, however, in order to avoid an undesirable diversion of time, effort and resources. It was a matter of priorities; while the creation of new air forces was definitely a long8term goal, it could not be allowed to interfere with the immediate aim of winning the war.44 There were other long8term considerations here, too. With their heritage, it was likely that the newly independent post8war Allied air forces would, in the short term at least, operate British aircraft and equipment. This would guarantee foreign markets for British industry, to the annoyance of the United States, which was looking to exploit these markets themselves and saw the British involvement as unfair competition. It became a delicate task to balance the temptations of A Halifax VI, previously of No 346 (French) Sqn, serving with GB2/21 Guyenne of the reconstituted post?war Arm%u00e9e de l%u2019Air.