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70that their English language skills were adequate, any Allied airman could be put through any training course or be posted to any role. Although there were certain restrictions early in the war that prevented Allied airmen from being posted to sensitive appointments, eg those associated with the use of radar, these were soon lifted, and foreign personnel were eventually employed on all manner of special work, including research and development.37 Furthermore, the field was open for the best to rise to the top. For example, in 1943, while the argument was raging over aircraft for the Congo, there were two Belgian squadrons serving on the front line with Fighter Command, and five RAF squadrons were actually being commanded by Belgian officers.38%u0009%u0013/&%u0017/%u0016%(%u0016%u0015%u0013/?%u0006 The fourth principle was Concentration. The Air Ministry undertook to form national squadrons as soon as sufficient personnel were available %u2013 both aircrew and, ideally, ground crews.39 This caused a number of problems, with some contingents trying to force the pace of the formation of national units, or providing clearly inadequate personnel. Probably the Air Ministry%u2019s worst experience was the formation of No 340 Sqn from Free French personnel. After more than a year of lobbying, the squadron was formed in Scotland in late 1941. The French had initially tried to have RAF ground crews assigned, but they eventually brought in their own men. Unfortunately, they were a mixture of French Air Force and French Naval Air Service personnel, who did not get on. Apart from political disagreements, which were, perhaps, inherent to French units,40 the naval personnel received better pay than their air force colleagues. To cap it all, some of the men transferred in were Tahitians, who found the Scottish winter uncomfortable, to say the least. The squadron would be a thorn in the RAF%u2019s side for the next twelve months until they finally acceded to the French pleas and drafted in British ground crews.41 The French ground crews were then sent to the Middle East, where further problems were on8going relating to who should control Free French units when serving in their own colonies in North Africa.42 The Air Ministry had managed to stifle this issue to a large extent, but national governments still felt they should have a greater say in how their national squadrons were run. Again De Gaulle was