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66absolute, and a way to keep hope and pride alive. Meanwhile, any problems, requests or ideas between the air forces were to be aired in open discussion without prejudice.23 Needless to say, for a variety of reasons, the system did not always run smoothly. Over the summer of 1943, for example, trouble began brewing with the Belgian contingent. A DAFL report observed that the Belgians were currently organised into three distinct groups: a Belgian headquarters and depot in the UK; the Belgian section of the RAFVR and a force in the Belgian Congo. It was proposed, in exchange for an inspectorate and a national depot, that this system should be streamlined by subsuming them all into the RAFVR. This would make for a much more efficient system. For example, at the time of the report, it was thought that some 200 personnel (it was later discovered that there were 250) were currently standing idle in the Congo, whereas gainful employment could easily be found for them in Europe. Hopefully the new system could impose some order on the Belgians: %u2018The total personnel of the three sections is only about 1,200, but owing to petty intrigue, personal jealousies and the lack of a co8ordinating Head, the problems attached to them and the administrative and organising work entailed is out of all proportion to their size.%u201924 The Air Ministry believed that the personnel in the Congo,25 who had been trained in South Africa, were being retained for reasons of political prestige. The Belgians had no aircraft, but were asking for, initially, six Oxfords for use as air ambulances within their colony, and for eighteen Hudsons or Sunderlands for coastal patrols. Clearly these aircraft were unnecessary, especially the latter. The Congo was well to the south of the Battle of the Atlantic and maritime patrol aircraft were desperately needed, as were the 250 personnel, where it was being fought further north. A terse series of letters full of veiled, and not8so8veiled, implications and accusations were exchanged regarding what aircraft were actually needed in the Congo and where the Belgian aircrew could best be employed. The Air Ministry perceived this to be a blatant case of the Belgian authorities wishing to boost their prestige and improve their powerbase to the detriment of the overall war effort. When the CAS, Sir Charles Portal, first