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65wonder that confusion occasionally occurred. In January, 1944, for example, the posting of a Norwegian pilot to No 138 Sqn at Tempsford was blocked because it was apparently against policy to employ foreign nationals on special duties units.20 HQ Bomber Command%u2019s polite response enquired, that if that really was the case, what should be done about the six Norwegian aircrew who were already at Tempsford serving with No 161 Sqn?21 It was decided that they could remain, but only on attachment, and that no further foreign personnel would be posted to either of the Special Duties squadrons. By the spring of 1942, the Allies had, nominally at least, reached agreement as to how the system should work. Most Allied personnel came under direct RAF control, and those contingents which had been given independent status %u2013 the Polish and Norwegian Air Forces %u2013 had also agreed to act in co8operation with the RAF towards their common goals, even if these common goals were occasionally kept slightly obscured. For example, the agreement with the Norwegians included a promise to liberate and restore their country, a statement conspicuous by its absence from the agreement with the Poles.22 Everyone was, within reason, allowed to exploit their own forces for propaganda purposes, to boost the prestige which was so vital to the exiled governments. To many of these defeated nations, their air forces promised a quick and glamorous way to show that their defeat was not The refugee air forces added some exotic types to the RAF%u2019s inventory, like the Iceland?based Northrop N?3PB floatplanes of No 330 (Norwegian) Sqn.