Page 63 - Demo
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                                    63during the Battle of France. Strangely, De Gaulle was never one of these, although the Royal Navy%u2019s attack on the French fleet at Mers8El8Kabir in early July 1940 certainly soured his private opinions (publicly, he supported the British action).10 He now believed that French pride and honour rested solely on his shoulders. Often comparing himself to Joan of Arc, he set out to win prestige for his Free French forces. But questions remained to be answered, notably: what legal status did De Gaulle actually have, when, unlike the other Allied nations, France still existed as an independent, albeit shrunken, country? So, while De Gaulle argued about issues of jurisdiction, such as, who was allowed to enforce discipline and administer punishments to French personnel, it was far from clear whether he was actually eligible to do these things himself.11 His claims, also made by other countries, that French troops should be subject to diplomatic immunity came to nothing, although some discussion followed to establish where this particular privilege did actually apply.12 In August, 1940, the issue of whether French military vehicles should be taxed and insured before use on British roads also saw fierce debate.13 These may seem like trivial points, but they are just a few of the hundreds of administrative, legal, diplomatic, practical and organisational issues that the Foreign Office, Air Ministry, War Office and Admiralty were obliged to address.  Perhaps more important were fundamental issues such as: what were the Allied air forces to be used for, and by whom? France, Belgium and the Netherlands all had overseas territories, albeit those of France were for the most part loyal to the new Vichy regime. While these could be a source of new personnel and, hopefully, financial support for the exiled forces, all to a certain extent were under threat; the Belgian Congo by internal unrest, and the Dutch East Indies by imminent Japanese expansionism in the Pacific. The Air Ministry feared that men and equipment might be siphoned off, or even sent wholesale to protect these colonies rather than being used in the main war effort against Germany,14 or that the Allied governments would at least insist on their forces being used only for narrowly defined tasks directly relating to the liberation of their countries.15 Agreements had to be made as to how the exiled forces were to be employed, an issue at least partly anticipated and deflected by the Air Ministry%u2019s insistence that foreign personnel be enlisted in the RAFVR. Still, the 
                                
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