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38ranking officers; leaving many of these unemployed and disaffected.11The Czechoslovaks faced an additional difficulty in that the ratio of officers to men in their contingent was, at one to five, uncommonly high. The surfeit of officers meant their promotion prospects, and those of NCOs and airmen in turn, were correspondingly poor and this affected morale.12 Inactivity bred indiscipline. In March 1940, a Flight Lieutenant Landau compiled a scathing report on the Poles at Eastchurch which depicted a camp riven by faction and favouritism, with officers and NCOs unable to maintain discipline over airmen preoccupied with %u2018matters of rank, prestige and%u2026%u2018%u201dhaving a good time.%u201d%u2019 Most worrying, it was suggested that the Poles%u2019 enthusiasm for fighting had waned.13 While it is likely that Landau exaggerated the extent of the malaise at Eastchurch, some of his criticisms appear to have been justified.14 The problems affecting the Czechoslovak contingent were of a different order. In July 1940, a mutiny at the Czechoslovak army camp at Cholmondeley Park was instigated by communist agitators attempting to sabotage the war effort in line with Comintern policy. The unrest spread in August to the air force units based at Honington and Duxford and, from there, to the CAF depot at Cosford. Some 450 pilots and ground staff serving at these stations drew up a list of demands which included promotion on merit rather than according to seniority or influence and an investigation into the alleged misconduct and defeatism of certain senior officers. To maintain order, Edvard Bene%u0161, the president of the Czechoslovak government8in8exile, was forced to concede the removal of General Slez%u00e1k, the CAF%u2019s Commander8in8Chief, and transfer a further nine officers to the army. The unrest was only cauterised with the signing of the Anglo8Czechoslovak Agreement of 25 October 1940, which formalised the legal status, rights and responsibilities of the Czechoslovak forces in the United Kingdom. Discipline and a semblance of harmony were at length restored to the CAF, but the British found the affair deeply unsettling.15 Had they but known it, there were more sinister forces at work. Although the exiles had been screened by British Intelligence, at least one Gestapo agent, the Czech Augustin P%u0159eu%u010dil, managed to penetrate Fighter Command and there may well have been others.16 It is perhaps understandable in this context that neither the Poles nor Czechoslovaks were initially entrusted with detailed information about

