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14 Apart from these indirect methods of using RAF and imperial influence to advantage, the RAAF also resorted to more open and formal methods, principally in the form of the two inspection tours and reports written on the RAAF by senior RAF officers, one at the end of each decade. Williams welcomed such visits, beforehand at least, and agitated for them behind the scenes. In 1927, before the first such tour by Sir John Salmond, Williams wrote frankly to Trenchard that he wanted such a visit to give an informed opinion. Sir John Salmond%u2019s report was predictably highly critical of much of the RAAF, though its introduction exonerated the hierarchy of much of the blame. It exposed the obsolete or worn out nature of much RAAF equipment, poor conditions of service, and low quality training. Although Williams suffered a little from the backlash which ensued, he was able to utilise the Salmond report to try to force the Government%u2019s hand on a number of matters, though the severe economic conditions which soon followed meant that material improvements in equipment were a long time coming. Although the government endorsed the Salmond report it was therefore not acted upon until much later, when it served as the basis for the RAAF%u2019s expansion scheme.19 Salmond believed, not without some justification, that Williams lacked practical experience of command, and also apparently felt that the RAAF was in danger of stagnating.20 To be fair, whatever his personal shortcomings, it is difficult to see what Williams could have done to prevent the latter given the situation he found himself in, and the fact that the Australian government accepted Salmond%u2019s report but failed to implement it for a decade clearly illustrates the problem he faced. Equally, it was probably precisely the underlying political and economic difficulties which ensured that Williams survived and was not replaced, temporarily or otherwise, by a senior RAF officer on secondment. In fact the Australian government subsequently used Williams%u2019 highly effective technique of appealing to the big brother RAF, against him. Shortly before the Second World War Williams was replaced as a result of criticisms made in another report on the RAAF by a senior RAF officer, Edward Ellington. I hope that this brief and superficial survey has given you a flavour of the close material, practical and intellectual links between the RAF and RAAF. As I indicated at the start of this paper it is not possible in